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Legal Phases of Professional Regulation *
By Spencer Gordon

Your committee on arrangements has given me the subject of
“Legal phases of professional regulation.” Although this is
rather broad, I assume that you are interested primarily in the
regulation of the profession of accountancy. This subject natu
rally divides itself into what has been done and what is pro
posed towards such regulation, and the further consideration
of the validity or possible invalidity of enactments in that regard.
All of the states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, the
Philippines and Porto Rico now have accountancy laws which
limit the use of the term “certified public accountant ” to account
ants upon whom this designation has been conferred by a state
board as a result of examination or compliance with other require
ments. Some states provide also for the use of the term “public
accountant” only by accountants who were in practice before the
enactment and who have registered as such.
Some of these statutes provide that the accountant, to be certi
fied or registered, must be a resident of the state in question.
Others provide that he must have a place for the regular transac
tion of business in the state. Some require both residence and a
place of business. Some require residence or a place of business.
A few require that he be a citizen of the state.
Almost all of these statutes contain provision for the recognition
of holders of certificates from other states. In some cases it is
provided that the local board may in its discretion waive its ex
amination, or that a certified public accountant from another state
shall receive a certificate if the applicant’s state grants a similar
privilege to a C. P. A. of the local state. In some, it is provided
that a C. P. A. from another state may be admitted if the appli
cant’s state has substantially or fully equivalent requirements for
the C. P. A. certificate. In a few states a C. P. A. from another
state may be admitted without qualification. Some of the states
have requirements as to the experience of the C. P. A. from the
foreign state, and in some cases it is required that the certificate
holder first become a resident of the local state.
These statutes have to do with the use of the designation “certi
fied public accountant” or “public accountant.” In only a few
* Address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, Septem
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instances have states as yet prohibited the practice of accountancy
by persons not holding the certificate or not registered. A few of
the statutes expressly provide that they are not to be construed
as prohibiting the practice of accountancy. One statute states
that it shall apply only to those holding themselves out as certified
public accountants. Some statutes expressly provide that they
are not to prevent unlicensed persons from acting as employees
of accountants.
There are a few statutes, however, which purport to prohibit
the practice of accountancy in the state by persons who have not
qualified as certified public accountants or public accountants
under the state law. There is, of course, a very substantial dif
ference between a law which permits anyone to act in fact as a
public accountant, but prohibits the use of the designation
“certified public accountant” or “public accountant” except to
those who have met the state’s requirements, and a law which
prohibits entirely from practice a person who is not a certified
public accountant or public accountant within the meaning of
the state law.
Most of the statutes in regard to the use of the designation
“certified public accountant” are silent as to accountants from
another state entering for occasional professional employment.
This silence is probably due to the fact that the statutes contain
no prohibition of the practice of accountancy, so that the account
ant who occasionally enters from another state, but has no
office and issues no certificates in the local state, does not come
in conflict with the laws restricting the use of the words “certified
public accountant” or “public accountant.” Some of these
statutes expressly state that they do not prohibit temporary en
gagements within the state. Even the states which prohibit the
practice of accountancy except to those who have complied with
the requirements of certification or registration have provisions
allowing the entry of accountants from other states to fulfill
specific engagements. One such statute provides for a temporary
certificate to enable the fulfilling of specific engagements,
the contracts for which were entered into outside of the
state. Another expressly provides that it does not prohibit the
entry of accountants from other states in pursuance of en
gagements originating from without the state. A third does
not prohibit temporary engagements incident to practice in the
state of domicile, provided the appointment of an agent for service
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of process is made five days before commencing work in the state.
These statutes, however, appear to have no provision for the non
resident accountant, who is not a C. P. A., entering the state for
temporary engagements.
It should be noted, however, that by some of the statutes the
non-resident accountant is prohibited from opening an office in
the state or from practising continuously therein by the restriction
against permanent practice by those who have not been given the
state certificate plus the requirement that the certificate can be
applied for only by residents. Bills providing for similar legisla
tion are under consideration by other state legislatures. Another
discrimination against non-residents is to require that all parties
in a firm practising as such in a state secure state certificates.

This represents the present state of the lawthroughout the states.
The question of the validity of these provisions may logically be
treated under three headings which are of progressive difficulty:
1. The validity of state laws restricting the use of the words
“certified public accountant” or “public accountant.”
2. The validity of state laws prohibiting practice within the
state except by those who have qualified as certified public ac
countants or public accountants.
3. The validity of state laws which make residence or citizen
ship a requirement for qualification as a certified public account
ant or public accountant, and restrict practice within the state to
persons who are so qualified, or impose other restrictions which
apply only to non-residents.
A state law is valid unless it conflicts with the Constitution of
the United States or with the constitution of the state in question.
I shall consider these statutes from the viewpoint of the constitu
tion of the United States, because it would be equivalent to writing
and reading an encyclopaedia for me to attempt an address based
on the differing constitutions of forty-eight states.
But when the contention is made that an accountancy law is
unconstitutional, the contestant would probably rely on the
following provisions of the constitution of the United States:
“The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states.” (Clause 1, article 4,
section 2.)
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
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any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” (14th amendment, section 1.)
In general it may be assumed that the right to practise account
ancy is a property right and a privilege or immunity within these
provisions, but this right, privilege or immunity must yield to the
police power of the state if the police power is exercised upon a
reasonable basis. Constitutional questions arising under these
sections thus involve questions of degree and are difficult of
solution.
I
The state laws restricting the use of the words “certified public
accountant” or “public accountant” have now been in effect for
a considerable time. They have come before the courts in a
number of cases, and I think it can be said with a fair degree of
certainty that there is nothing unconstitutional in a statute which
creates a state board with power to give reasonable examinations
or enforce other reasonable requirements as a result of which per
sons will be given the right to the designation of “certified public
accountant,” and prohibiting the use of such designation by all
others, or requiring accountants who are already in practice
to register as such in order to use the term “public accountant.”
ii

When we consider, however, the statutes which purport to
prohibit entirely the practice of public accountancy by persons
who have not met these requirements, we are confronted with a
more difficult problem. It would seem reasonable to provide that
an accountant may not call himself a “certified public account
ant” or even a “public accountant” when he has not in fact been
so certified by the state board nor conformed to the requirements
for “public accountants,” but it is not so clear that the state may
deprive of his means of livelihood a man who has not received
the state certificate or so qualified.
There have been two decisions where restrictive statutes have
been declared in violation of constitutional provisions. In State
v. Riedell, 109 Okla. 35 (1924), a statute which prohibited an
uncertified accountant from engaging in practice was held to
violate the provisions of the constitutions of the United States and
of the state of Oklahoma. The court said:
“Our conclusion, therefore, is that the act, in so far as it pro
hibits uncertified accountants from holding themselves out as
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professional or expert accountants or auditors for compensation or
engaging in the practice of that profession, is in conflict with the
spirit and express provision of the constitution and void, in this,
that it abridges the right of private property and infringes upon
the right of contract in matters purely of private concern, bearing
no perceptible relation to the general or public welfare, and
thereby tends to create a monopoly in the profession of account
ancy for the benefit of certified accountants, and denies to un
certified accountants the equal protection of the laws, and the
enjoyment of the gains of their own industry. The defendants
are not engaged in the exercise of a franchise, but a constitution
ally guaranteed right.”
In Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253 (1926), a similar Illinois statute
was held unconstitutional. The court referred to provisions of
the constitution of Illinois similar to those of the federal constitu
tion. The case is illuminating in the precise statement of the
court as to how far such a statute may go:
“We do not say that it is beyond the power of the general
assembly to enact a statute requiring that no one shall use the
term ‘ certified public accountant ’ or the term ‘ public accountant ’
without having met the requirements of such an act. Such a
provision may well be within the power of the legislature on the
ground that it is to the public interest that no one shall use a
term indicating that he has been examined and certified as an
accountant when such is not the fact. . . . Such is a misrepre
sentation which the legislature may prevent by statute. There
is, as we view it, however, a wide difference between acts of such
character and one which provides that no one who has not re
ceived a certificate as public accountant from the department of
registration and education shall be allowed to work at the busi
ness or occupation of accountancy for more than one person.
Such an act does not spring from a demand for the protection of
the public welfare but is an unwarranted regulation of private
business and the right of the citizen to pursue the ordinary occu
pations of life.”

These decisions might not necessarily be followed in other
states, for a strong argument can be made that the practice of pub
lic accountancy does affect the public welfare and is not a private
business. There have been decisions of many courts holding that
statutes prohibiting the practice of various other professions and
occupations by persons not licensed by a state board, after com
pliance with reasonable tests, are constitutional, on the ground
that the right to earn a livelihood may be limited by a statute
which is a reasonable exercise of the police power of a state. Such
decisions can be found as to architects, barbers, dentists, locomo
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tive engineers, motion picture machine operators, pharmacists,
physicians and plumbers. The Oklahoma and Illinois courts dis
tinguished these cases on the ground that the occupations in ques
tion affected the public health and safety, but it can be argued
forcefully that the same power which permits the state to safe
guard the health of the public also will permit the state to safe
guard the pocketbooks of the public.
Thus, in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, in which the
supreme court of the United States held that a state statute
requiring physicians to procure certificates was not unconsti
tutional, the reasons given appear broad enough to cover public
accountancy:
“But there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right (to practise
medicine) where its exercise is not permitted because of a failure
to comply with conditions imposed by the state for the protection
of society. The power of the state to provide for the general
welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations
as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception
and fraud. . . . The nature and extent of the qualifications re
quired must depend primarily upon the judgment of the state
as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or
profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no
objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency
or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such calling
or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and
application that they can operate to deprive one of his right to
pursue a lawful vocation.
“. . . Every one may have occasion to consult him, but com
paratively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill
which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurance
given by his licence, issued by an authority competent to judge
in that respect that he possesses the requisite qualifications.”
This opinion of the United States supreme court can be para
phrased to apply to the profession of accountancy. Its regulation
will tend to secure the people of the state against the consequences
of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud.
Everyone may have occasion to consult the accountant, but few
can judge of his qualifications, so that they must rely upon the
assurance given by his licence. It can thus be argued that the
accountant subjects himself to reasonable regulation by holding
himself out to the public as having professional qualifications, and
that there is no logical distinction between the regulation of the
physician who deals with physical health and the regulation of the
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accountant who deals with financial health. Thus, in Holsman v.
Thomas, 112 Ohio state 397 (1925), the Ohio supreme court held
valid an ordinance regulating auctioneers, saying:
“Now, the police power relates not merely to the public health
and to public physical safety, but also to public financial safety.”
The Oklahoma and Illinois decisions holding that the practice
of accountancy can not be regulated seem also to ignore the fact
that the regulation of lawyers is not confined to practice before
the courts, but extends to the giving of professional advice, in
which there is now a decided similarity between the function of
the lawyer and accountant. Certainly neither profession has to
do with public health—both deal with property. Many states
also require dealers in securities to obtain licences upon satis
factory evidence of the good business repute of the applicants and
their agents, revocable on evidence of bad repute. The constitu
tionality of these laws was assailed on the ground that they were
an illegal control of private concerns, but the statutes have been
sustained by the state courts and by the United States supreme
court, and are in effect today as the well known “blue sky laws.”
The police power of the state which was invoked in these laws was
concerned directly with the protection of the property of the
people of the state—the blue sky laws had nothing to do with the
public health.
I feel, therefore, that the Oklahoma and Illinois decisions do not
necessarily settle the question, and that a law restricting the
practice of public accountancy to persons who hold the state
certificate might in other states and by the United States supreme
court be held not to conflict with the federal constitution, on the
ground that the practice of public accountancy is one which
affects the people of the state generally and may therefore be
regulated in a reasonable way in proper exercise of the police
power. Such a law could perhaps prohibit the use of the words
“certified public accountant” or even “accountant” on the
stationery of an uncertified or unlicensed person, or on the door
of his office, or the holding out to the public that he is a certified
public accountant or even an accountant, or the giving of an opin
ion in writing certifying as to any accounting matters and pur
porting to be made by a certified public accountant or by an
accountant. But it would be much more difficult to sustain a law
which went beyond the restriction of the public practice of ac
countancy or forbade the private employment of a person
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by another person to do bookkeeping, give financial advice
or do anything else that is done by accountants. The law
must restrict only the public practice of accountancy if the
argument that I have suggested in favor of its constitutionality
is to apply.
To summarize: laws prohibiting entirely the practice of public
accountancy by persons who have not met the statutory require
ments have been held unconstitutional by the highest courts of
Oklahoma and Illinois. There are no decisions holding such laws
constitutional. The question, however, can not be considered
settled, as there are several states which have similar restrictive
legislation the validity of which has not been tested, and a strong
argument can be made that such laws are a valid exercise of the
police power if they do not go beyond the regulation of the prac
tice of accountancy in its public aspects.

III
We now come to the question of the validity of state laws which
make residence or citizenship a requirement for qualification as a
certified public accountant or public accountant, and restrict
practice within the state to persons who are so qualified, or
impose other restrictions which apply only to non-residents. Can
the state give its residents an advantage in the practice of account
ancy over non-residents?
Of course, if the Oklahoma and Illinois decisions are correct
and a state can not prevent the practice of public accountancy
by an uncertified person, then this final question does not arise.
Any non-resident accountant who is dissatisfied with the difficul
ties put in the way of his practice would include among his con
tentions the broad one that the state had no right to restrict
accountancy practice at all either as to residents or non-residents.
As this point has been discussed, I shall pass to questions peculiar
to the distinction between residents and non-residents.
If the state can constitutionally restrict only the practice of
public accountancy as opposed to private employment, as was
suggested under the last heading, it can be argued that the isolated
act of a non-resident in entering a state temporarily to make an
audit as a result of an outside employment would not be a proper
subject of restriction, on the ground that the accountant who has
no office in the state, who does not habitually practise in the
state and issues no certificates in the state or to residents of
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the state, does not hold himself out to the public of the state as
being a public accountant. Some state statutes do, however,
purport to restrict this sort of practice. I know of no decision on
the precise point.
Let us now consider the non-resident accountant who wishes
to practise frequently in the state, to open an office in the state,
to qualify as a certified public accountant of the state or to be
a member of a firm which has an office in the state. Does an
accountancy law which discriminates against such a non-resident
abridge his privileges and immunities, deprive him of property
or deny him the equal protection of the laws? Time does not
permit a detailed discussion of the construction that has been
given these constitutional provisions. Perhaps the simplest
statement that can be made is that the police power of the state
may be exercised in a reasonable way without infringing them.
The problem, therefore, would be whether or not a requirement of
residence in the state bears such a reasonable relation to the
protection of the public in the regulation of the practice of public
accountancy that inclusion of such a requirement in a statute is
a reasonable exercise of the police power. Although there is a
decided conflict in the decisions, the United States supreme court
case which seems to be the closest would indicate that such a
distinction may be made between residents and non-residents.
But if all the facts in regard to the practice of accountancy were
brought before the court it might well result in a contrary holding,
on the ground that there is no reasonable basis for discrimination
against non-resident accountants.
The argument in favor of the constitutionality of a law dis
criminating against non-residents might run somewhat along the
following lines:—The examining board can better determine the
moral character, standing and ability of residents. A resident
accountant can do better work because of his knowledge of local
conditions. The disgrace resulting from discovery in a dishonest
act would be a more powerful deterrent upon a resident account
ant. The board can more effectively control residents. Process
can be more readily served upon a resident. Damages can be
more readily collected from a resident.
But these arguments, which have been made in regard to other
occupations, can be opposed with considerable force when applied
to the present practice of accountancy. It may be argued in reply
that the board can, in fact, determine the character of and can
368

Legal Phases of Professional Regulation

control both residents and non-residents, that a knowledge of
local conditions such as could not be obtained by a non-resident is
seldom necessary to the practice of modern accountancy, that
discovery of a dishonest act wherever committed would injure
the accountant wherever located, that provision could be made
that a non-resident must appoint an agent for service of process,
and that whether damages could more readily be collected from a
resident or non-resident would be problematical in each case.
Passage of laws discriminating against the non-resident ac
countant seems to be in opposition to the nationalization of
business which is constantly increasing and which has been so
ably described by Mr. Peloubet. (See The Journal of Ac
countancy, October, 1931.)
Consider, for example, the
metropolitan area of New York. It would hardly seem in ac
cordance with present realities if a law could impose a barrier
between those parts of New Jersey, New York and Connecticut
which lie in that area. There is reasonable ground for contending
that no purpose can be found for legislation which discriminates
between the resident and non-resident accountant, other than
the purpose of protecting the local field for the local accountant,
and if this could be demonstrated the statute could hardly be
sustained under the police power. While involving a discrimina
tion within the state, the decision in Sayre Borough v. Phillips,
148 Pa. 482 (1892), is interesting in that regard. An ordinance of
the borough prohibiting non-residents from peddling was declared
invalid, the court saying:

“That the resident dealer and peddler may enjoy a larger trade,
the non-resident peddler is shut out. If the borough authorities
may lawfully regulate the business of peddling for the benefit of
residents, we see no reason why they may not lay their hands in
like manner on every department of trade and of professional
labor, and protect the village lawyer and doctor as well as the
village grocer and peddler. . . .
“The present question is whether, under the pretense of police
control, trade may be regulated in the interest of resident dealers
by making the same business a lawful one to all who live on one
side of a municipal line, and an unlawful one to all who live on
the other side. We are very clear in our convictions that this
can not be done, ...”
The difficulty of reconciling the decisions of the federal courts
will appear from the statement of a few of them. Statutes have
been held constitutional in the following cases:—Where resident
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property owners were given the right to stop improvements and
assessments by filing protest, with no similar right to non-resident
property owners. Where personal service was required on resi
dent owners of land, and service by publication only on non
residents. Where resident and non-resident decedents were
taxed at different rates. Where the statute of limitations was
longer in the case of a resident. Where residents were given
greater dower rights than non-residents. Where the use of a
state highway by non-resident automobilists was declared equiv
alent to the appointment of the registrar of motor vehicles as agent
for service of process. Where a court was authorized to dismiss
in its discretion a suit brought by a non-resident against a foreign
corporation but was not authorized so to dismiss a suit brought
by a resident against a foreign corporation. Where a non-resident
was required to give bond for costs not required of a resident.
On the other hand, the following statutes have been declared
unconstitutional :—Where a lower scale of licence fees was provided
for resident traders than for non-residents. Where residents were
given priority in distribution of assets of foreign corporations.
Where a higher privilege tax was imposed on companies having
their chief office outside the state. Where it was provided that
no one might be licensed as a peddler who had not resided in the
state for one year. Where residents only were permitted to be
appointed trustees by deed. Where non-residents were denied
the right to obtain licences as stationary engineers. Where a
higher licence tax was imposed on non-resident bakeries than on
resident bakeries.
The case which probably would be most strongly relied upon in
any argument in favor of the constitutionality of an accountancy
law discriminating against non-residents is La Tourette v. Mc
Master, 248 U. S. 465, decided in 1919, where a law limiting to
residents of South Carolina the right to engage in the insurance
brokerage business was held constitutional in a proceeding brought
by a non-resident who contended that the law as applied to him
was unconstitutional, the court saying:
“' It is important for the protection of the interests of the people
of the state that the business should be in the hands of competent
and trustworthy persons.’ And we may say that this result can
be more confidently and completely secured through resident
brokers, they being immediately under the inspection of the
commissioner of insurance.”
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The close analogy between this case and a case limiting to resi
dents the right to practise public accountancy will readily be
observed. On the other hand, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352,
as recently as 1927 there appeared the following statement by Mr.
Justice Butler:
“But a state may not withhold from non-resident individuals
the right of doing business therein.”

My own feeling is that if there came to the United States
supreme court a case involving a discrimination by state law against
non-resident accountants, the court’s decision would depend upon
the showing in regard to the present practice of accountancy and
the reasonableness of the particular statute as to that particular
profession. There is always a presumption that a law is consti
tutional, and a strong fact presentation showing the unreasonable
ness of the statute in question would have to be made in order to
overcome this presumption. The present attitude of the supreme
court in that regard is stated in O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, decided in 1931, and sustaining a state law
forbidding any insurer licensed in the state to allow a commission
in excess of a reasonable amount. The court there said:
“The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly
within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it
void on the ground that the specific method of regulation pre
scribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the pre
sumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. It
does not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of
which the court must take judicial notice, that in New Jersey
evils did not exist in the business of fire insurance for which this
statutory provision was an appropriate remedy.”

Thus an accountant wishing to obtain a decision that a statute
discriminating against non-residents is unconstitutional should
attempt to show that the restriction of the right to practise ac
countancy to residents only or discriminating against non-resi
dents is not a reasonable way to deal with the evils of dishonest,
careless or incompetent accountancy. A basis for such a showing
might be found in records of accounting societies, articles on the
subject by eminent accountants and testimony given in court
as to the present practices in the accounting profession. Those
wishing to maintain the constitutionality of such a law and to re
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inforce the presumption of constitutionality which always exists
could use the same sort of evidence to the extent that it would be
helpful to them. I think that the delivery of Mr. Peloubet’s
address is an important step in the creation of a literature on this
subject, and I hope that other accountants will be alert to gather
material and will express and publish their views.

As I have stated, the views expressed in this paper have been
concerned with the provisions of the federal constitution. In
any case which may arise the provisions of the constitution of the
state in question should be studied with great care. The Illinois
decision which I have discussed turned in part upon the violation
of provisions of the Illinois constitution prohibiting the granting
of special privileges.
I hope you will not be too much disappointed by the apparent
inconclusiveness of this paper. I can not tell you whether or not
an untested law is constitutional. That is only known when the
court of last resort has spoken; and many times there are five
judges on one side and four on the other. How can anyone pre
dict who will be the infallible five? All that we can do in difficult
questions of this sort is to indicate trends, to suggest arguments
that may be made on either side, to collect the decisions which
seem most analogous, and to make suggestions as to the method
of showing the courts what are the true facts in regard to the pres
ent practice of accountancy. I can only hope that this paper will
constitute some contribution to the solution of the problems.
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